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In his latest book, the noted philosopher of science Ian Hacking turns his 
attention to mathematics, a long-standing interest of his, heretofore seldom 
indulged.  His previous work, though it hasn’t always been universally found 
convincing, has been unfailingly provocative. The present work fits the 
pattern.   
  Some mathematicians seeing the title of Hacking’s latest book may 
read it as meaning something like, “Why can’t we just get rid of philosophy 
mathematics?” asked in a tone of voice suggesting that it would be a very 
good thing if we could. After all, did not Hilbert himself announce, speaking 
of foundational questions, that what he wanted to do with them was to get 
rid once and for all [einfürallemal aus der Welt zu schaffen] of them? But 
this is not what is intended. Hacking doesn’t think philosophy of mathematics will ever go away for good, be got rid of once and for all, and 
he genuinely means to ask why this is so: What is it about mathematics that 
historically has kept drawing philosophers back to it, time and again?  
  The answer suggested is that there are two factors at work. One is the 
experience of following a compelling proof. The seeming inevitability of the 
conclusion, the feeling that it is not something one is free to take or leave as 
one chooses, Hacking cites as an ultimate motivation behind philosophies 
that affirm the independent reality of a realm of mathematical facts, from 
Plato to Hardy [3]. The other factor is the observation that mathematical 
desk-work again and again proves useful in dealing with the world outside 
the mathematician’s office. How by just sitting and thinking we (or some of 
us) can arrive at results applicable to the world around us has puzzled 
thinkers from Kant to Wigner [4]. 
  The two features are separate. That results should prove applicable to 
the physical universe even though they were obtained by pure desk work, 
without controlled experimentation on or systematic observation of the 
material world, can be surprising even if what the desk work produces is not 
compelling deductive proofs but “only” suggestive heuristic arguments. And 
with the two factors being separate, the material in the book is divided into 
two more or less separate parts, though with a lot of back and forth between them, one devoted to proof, the other to applications. 
  Neither the part about proof nor the part about applications is 
concerned only with their role in perennially drawing the attention of 
philosophers to mathematics. And beyond the general division into these two 
broad topics, the book is rather loosely organized and digressive, not to say 
rambling, in a way that makes it quite impossible for the reviewer to 
summarize its contents in an even halfway adequate fashion. The analytical 
table of contents goes on for six pages, and there is nothing I would leave 
out; but this means that even to list the topics addressed would take up more 
space than is reasonable for a review.  
  One thing just leads to another: If a philosophical view is stated, some 
mathematical example will be wanted to illustrate it, but then at least an 
informal explanation of the key concepts in the example will be wanted also, 
and perhaps a capsule bio of the author or authors of the relevant result or 
results, and even perhaps in cases where they have won prizes something by 
way of description of the prizes and who established or who awards them, 
and so on. As a result, in the index one finds Fermat and the Fields Institute, 
formalism and Foucault, the four-color problem and Frege and Freud all 
rubbing shoulders. 
 Not Philosophy but about Philosophy 
Now it is one thing to write about a field, and another to work in it. Hacking 
asserts early and emphatically that his is a book about philosophy of 
mathematics, but not a work of philosophy of mathematics. He is indeed 
quite reticent about his own philosophical views, preferring to survey those 
of  others. And the book is wholly free of philosophical polemics: Hacking 
manages to find something nice to say about almost every writer he 
discusses or even just mentions in passing, even writers who disagree 
profoundly with each other, and even writers who disagree profoundly with 
the views with which Hacking shows himself most sympathetic. (Conflict of 
interest disclosure: This includes the present reviewer.) 
  And while Hacking has quite a bit to say about important figures in 
the history of philosophy, and to a lesser extent of mathematics, he also 
avoids scholarly controversies over the interpretation of the thought of 
historical figures. Thus he frequently quotes one of his favorites, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, about the exegesis of whose cryptic works there have 
notoriously been very bitter controversies, but cheerfully says that it doesn’t 
matter to him if he has got Wittgenstein right, though he thinks he has. For 
what it is worth I am mostly inclined to agree, though I am struck by 
Hacking’s omission of certain of Wittgenstein’s dicta that if quoted might make the philosopher seem a less sympathetic figure to mathematicians. Try 
this one (directed against Hardy): “…what a mathematician is inclined to say 
about the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of 
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment. …  like the 
treatment of an illness.” ([6], 254-5) Or this one (directed against Hilbert on 
“Cantor’s paradise”): “Philosophical clarity will have the same effect on the 
growth of mathematics as sunlight has on the growth of potato shoots. (In a 
dark cellar they grow yards long.)” ([5], 381) 
  More importantly, while a contrast between what Hacking calls 
“cartesian” and “leibnizian” proofs or conceptions of proof runs through 
much of his discussion, he spells the labels with a small cee and el by way of 
indicating that he’s not especially concerned to defend any claims about the 
exact content of the thought of the historical Descartes and Leibniz. 
  One respect, apart from its livelier style, in which Hacking’s book 
differs from conventional philosophical writing about mathematics is that an 
enormous amount of work goes into gathering food for thought, but much 
less into boiling it down, chewing it over, and digesting it. For instance, the 
material on applications goes on at surprising length and depth about 
etymological issues (when did the expression  “mixed mathematics” gave 
way to “applied mathematics”?) and sociological ones (how the organization of universities into departments in the nineteenth century differ between 
Britain and Germany?), but it wasn’t clear to me what we are supposed to 
make of all this, fun as it was to read about. 
  The material on proof also shows a tendency to give priority to 
information gathering over critical analysis. This is perhaps especially so in 
connection with the cartesian/leibnizian distinction. It is used as a peg on 
which to hang the discussion of various issues and episodes and 
personalities, but the kind of questions that a conventional philosopher of 
mathematics would feel compelled to address in connection with such a 
distinction are just not gone into. To cite just one crucial issue, are the 
various rough characterizations offered of  “cartesian” (or “leibnizian”) 
proof equivalent, all pointing towards the same feature? In other words, do 
we have one distinction here, or are several being run together? 
  I suspect the latter. Hacking begins by noting that Descartes speaks 
(though as Hacking significantly admits, not in his mathematical writings) 
of getting an entire proof in the mind all at once. Hacking doesn’t, however, 
mention why Descartes needs such a notion in his philosophical system. 
Descartes, towards the ultimate aim of arguing that all knowledge depends 
on knowledge of God, suggests that the conclusions of an atheist 
mathematician, or any conclusion arrived at by a series of steps, can be rendered doubtful by the reflection that maybe a tricky demon was just 
making it seem that one step followed another. Descartes has a argument 
why we can’t really be deceived by such a tricky demon (the main 
consideration being that there is a God Who would prevent it), but that 
argument itself consists of a series of steps, and so presumably can be 
rendered doubtful: Maybe the tricky demon’s trickiest trick is to trick 
Descartes into believing there is no tricky demon. Only if Descartes can see 
the whole argument in a flash and not as a succession of steps, if he can get 
the entire proof into his mind all at the same time, can he be freed from the 
possibility of having his conclusions rendered doubtful. 
  But Hacking’s notion of “cartesian proof” slides from this first 
characterization, as a proof that one can get the entirety of into one’s mind 
all at once, to a different characterization, as a proof that does not merely 
convince us that a result is true but explain to us why the result is true. This 
is a distinction about which in the last decades there has been a great deal of 
discussion by philosophers of mathematics, especially those who identify 
themselves as “philosophers of mathematical practice”, with rather meager 
and inconclusive results (a fact that should hardly surprise Hacking, familiar 
as he must be with how intense philosophical investigation of “scientific 
explanation” in theoretical physics a couple of decades back led to similarly meager and inconclusive results). And needless to say there are many 
quotable things mathematicians have said about such a distinction at one 
time or another, too, not all by any means pointing in the same direction. But 
what does a proof’s being explanatory have to do with our being able to get 
the entire proof into the mind all at once? 
  There are lots of proofs of mathematical propositions p that one could 
say explain why p and don’t just convince that p. But I don’t find myself 
able in any interesting case to get the entirety of such a proof into my mind 
at once, to see the proof as a single step rather than a succession. Hacking 
cites Littlewood’s version of the proof that there can be no decomposition of 
a cube into cubes all of unequal size, which appears as an epigraph to the 
book. I myself don’t find it easy to take this in as a single step rather than a 
succession of several — to see in a flash why the result is true, which would 
presumably include seeing why the same argument doesn’t work one 
dimension down to show that there is no decomposition of a square into 
squares of unequal size — especially when one fills in the reasoning needed 
to establish a lemma that Littlewood simply calls obvious. Well, perhaps my 
mind is just too small for this to fit in all at once. One of Hacking’s more 
amusing, and only too true, observations about the experience of compelling 
proofs is that most people don’t have it.  
Glitter    
If Hacking’s  approach does not stop to carry out the kind of critical analysis 
that would be needed to establish, say, that in speaking of “cartesian” and 
“leibnizian” proofs one is looking at a clear, univocally-characterized 
dichotomy, my saying so is not a matter of complaining. It is a matter 
explaining how what Hacking is doing in writing about philosophy of 
mathematics differs from working in philosophy of mathematics — how it 
differs and why it may be more fun. Writing in philosophy of mathematics 
generally must plod along at a slow and deliberate pace. Writing about 
philosophy of mathematics can be breezier and take us to more interesting 
places in less time.  
  If I did have any complaint, it would not be about the kind of book 
Hacking has chosen to write, but about his tendency, when he wants to 
illustrate some phenomenon, to pass over homelier examples and go 
immediately for the most subtle and sophisticated — and recent. Hacking 
quotes Wittgenstein as warning against being taken in by “glitter”, being 
distracted in philosophy of mathematics (and not just of mathematics) from 
what is essential by glamorous results. Hacking himself, as he is not 
unaware, sometimes runs the risk of being distracted, or distracting his readers, in just this way.  
   Let me illustrate this rather abstract remark by a concrete case.  In 
speaking of what moves some mathematicians and philosophers to speak of 
mathematical reality as being “out there” before we discover it, Hacking 
slides from talking about compelling proofs to talking about compelling 
results, even when the proofs are long and laborious. He mentions 
classification theorems, which are indeed excellent examples. There is 
nothing like learning that there are exactly N of something or other to 
encourage the thought that all N of them were “out there” before we found 
out about them. The five Platonic solids used to be used as an illustrative 
example in this way. Hacking suggests that, historically important as this 
example may have been, it has become so familiar that we are now blasé 
about it, and need a different example.  
  He then goes at once for the classification of simple groups. This 
provides opportunities to mention various interesting people and exotic 
topics, but there is no hope in a work at a semipopular level of explaining 
what, say, John Conway’s “monstrous moonshine” actually amounted to, or 
even what specifically a sporadic simple group is. Surely there must be 
examples — two-manifolds, perhaps, or non-planar graphs — less 
hackneyed than the Platonic solids but less ferociously technical than finite simple groups. 
  Another very interesting phenomenon Hacking gets into, on his way 
to discussing the extramathematical applicability of mathematics, is 
intramathematical applicability, beginning with Descartes’ application of 
algebra to geometry. That example by now has something in common with 
the Platonic solids example, namely, a degree of familiarity that makes it 
unexciting. Again Hacking goes off in the direction of very sophisticated 
material indeed — the Langlands program, no less — in search of fresher 
examples, and gets into material so complicated that he himself is not sure 
whether one should speak of applying one field to another or merely of 
seeing analogies between fields. 
  Again there are near to hand simpler examples of the phenomenon of 
surprising connections between diverse mathematical specialties that could 
have been cited instead or as well. There is, to begin with, De Morgan’s 
well-known old story ([1], 284-287) of an encounter with an acquaintance, 
apparently in the insurance business, in which they were talking of life 
expectancies and De Morgan cited some actuarial formula, probably related 
to the normal distribution, involving the symbol π for the famous constant, 
the ratio of circumference to diameter. The reply was, “Oh, my dear friend! 
that must be a delusion; what can the circle have to do with the numbers alive at the end of a given time?” This simple example at least shows clearly 
the first crucial feature that needs to be mentioned in connection with 
surprising connections: There isn’t going to be any nonmathematical 
explanation of them. 
 
Summary 
  There is much more in the book. I have taken well over two thousand 
words without really touching on the aspects of the book touted in the 
publisher’s blurb: Discussion of the historical question where proof came 
from, and where the distinction between applied and pure, and of the 
question “What is mathematics?” Any answer to this last is likely to look 
disappointing after the splendid opening to Timothy Gowers’ editorial 
preface to [2], in which he quotes Russell’s definition of mathematics and 
adds that his volume (of 1000+ pages) is about what Russell’s definition 
leaves out. Hacking gives the question only about 35 pages, but he does 
manage to bring in curious information you won’t find in the Gowers 
volume.  
  Perhaps I should stop here. But before closing, let me mention one 
more respect in which Hacking’s book about philosophy of mathematics 
differs from books in philosophy of mathematics: Since it is as far as possible from being one long, connected argument for a distinctive, unifying 
thesis, the reader can freely dip into it, open it almost anywhere and just start 
reading with pleasure and profit. 
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